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Portraying poverty: The economics and ethics of Factual Welfare 
Television  
Authors: Sara De Benedictis, Kim Allen and Tracey Jensen 
 
Abstract  
 
Since 2013 there has been an explosion of a new genre of factual programming on 
British television that centres on the everyday lives of people claiming benefits. The 
emergence of Factual Welfare Television (FWT) has coincided with intensifying 
public and political debates about poverty and the British welfare state, and has 
proved a deeply controversial and contested genre. While programme-makers have 
argued that FWT fulfils a public service mandate to inform audiences, critics have 
accused producers of making inaccurate, provocative and unethical television. 
Sociological enquiries into FWT have focused on the representations within these 
programmes and audience reception, arguing that these contribute to hardening anti-
welfare sentiment. This article presents a complementary and urgent line of enquiry 
into FWT, locating it squarely within the conditions of its production by including 
questions of cultural labour, diversity in the workforce, and increasing competition 
and deregulation within broadcasting. We argue that market logics governing 
broadcasting discipline cultural workers and contribute to the production of reductive 
and stigmatising representations of social class and poverty. In doing so, we offer new 
insights into relationships between television production, representation and ± 
consequently ± consumption. 
 
Keywords: austerity, cultural work, cultural production, diversity, factual television, 
poverty porn, reality television, social class, welfare 
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Introduction  
 
In 2013, a new genre of popular factual programming exploded on British television, 
what we call here Factual Welfare Television (FWT). Centred on the everyday lives 
of people in poverty and receiving state benefits, it includes programmes such as 
Benefits Street (Channel 4 2014 2015), On Benefits and Proud (Channel 5 2013), We 
All Pay Your Benefits (BBC1 2013) and %ULWDLQ¶V Benefit Tenants (Channel 4 2015). 
The emergence of FWT has coincided with an intensifying public debate about 
poverty and welfare in Britain and a radical project of welfare reform following the 
2008 global economic crisis and subsequent implementation of austerity measures. 
Introduced by the Coalition (2010-2015) and now Conservative (2015-present) 
government, this reform project has involved a vast swathe of public spending cuts 
and a drastic reduction of public expenditure on working-age benefits in an attempt to 
address so-called µZHOIDUH GHSHQGHQF\¶ and create a µOHDQHU¶ state. Described as µWKH 
deepest and most precipitate cuts ever made in social SURYLVLRQ¶ (Taylor-Gooby 
2013), these reforms have had a disproportionate impact on already-vulnerable groups 
(Duffy 2013; Bennett and Daly 2014). 
Against this backdrop, FWT has become a mainstay of most broadcasters and 
many programmes have attracted record viewing figures. For example, the first series 
of Benefits Street delivered Channel 4 over 5.1 million viewers, the highest the 
channel had attracted for at several years (Kanter 2014). Yet, this genre has also been 
deeply contested and controversial. Programme-makers and commissioners have 
argued that FWT fulfils an important public service mandate to µLQIRUP¶ and educate, 
respond to public concern around welfare (Ofcom 2014), and µUDLVe provocative 
questions about what kind of safety net the poorest should KDYH¶ (Alcinii 2016). In 
contrast, critics have described FWT as exploitative, inaccurate and entrenching 
damaging myths about those in poverty, with some labelling it as µSRYHUW\ SRUQ¶ 
(Broady 2015; Church Action on Poverty 2015). By µFRPSRXQG>LQJ@ stereotypes by 
pitting deserving against undeserving SRRU¶ (Scott-Paul 2015) some programmes have 
been accused of contributing to a hardening anti-welfare sentiment among the general 
public. Indeed, whilst public support for social security usually increases in the 
aftermath of recession, this support in fact declined after 2008-2009 (Taylor-Gooby 
2013). Some have proposed that such unprecedented reversals in public attitudes 
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towards welfare have been amplified by virulent welfare myths circulating across 
policy and the media (Hills 2015).  
The genre of FWT ± and surrounding debates ± has occasioned a fascinating 
reflexive moment within the industry regarding the ethics and economics of popular 
factual television. This moment has reanimated longstanding academic debates about 
how television, as a representational form, intersects with, and (re)produces, wider 
classificatory systems and modes of producing social inequality (Biressi and Nunn 
2008; Wood and Skeggs 2011). In this article, we situate FWT as a productive site to 
(re)examine the relationship between inequalities (in this case, social class) and 
cultural production, representation and consumption. 
While a burgeoning body of sociological work has examined FWT 
representations (and to a lesser extent, audience reception), this article locates 
FWT squarely within the conditions of its production. In shifting the spotlight to 
questions of production and cultural labour, we follow calls for analyses of cultural 
representations that critically interrogates the µHSLVWHPRORJLFDO HIIHFWV¶ ± or 
consequences ± of their production: that is how production processes shape the ways 
in which µGLIIHUHQFH¶ is represented and understood (Saha 2012; Gray 2016). Thus we 
consider how market logics governing cultural production discipline cultural work 
and cultural workers, shaping how poverty, social class and welfare come to be 
represented and consumed by the broader public.  
We begin by situating FWT within the genre of reality television, and consider 
how FWT extends WHOHYLVLRQ¶V class-making project within the context of austerity. 
We introduce some of the existing analysis of FWT representations upon which this 
article builds and discuss our methodology. 
 
Situating the contested terrain of FWT: THOHYLVLRQ¶V class politics  
 
Having proven its popularity through record viewing figures, its ability to generate 
attention in other media sites, and its purchase on political and public debate, FWT 
has emerged as a growing and fast-mutating genre of popular factual programming. 
Several programmes have been commissioned for further series, accompanied by 
related µHYHQW¶ television (e.g. The Big Benefits Row: Live), and franchised outside the 
UK. FWT is a contested, inventive and mobile genre which encompasses various 
formats, from docusoaps (e.g. %ULWDLQ¶V Benefit Tenants, On Benefits and Proud, 
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Benefits Street) to more conventional documentary (e.g. Battling with Benefits, BBC 
One Wales, 2016; 'RQ¶W Cap My Benefits, BBC, 2014), as well as hybrid µJDPHGRF¶ 
formats (e.g. Benefits Britain 1949, Channel 4, 2013; The Great British Benefits 
Handout, Channel 5, 2016-) and µFHOHEUHDOLW\¶ (e.g. Celebs on Benefits: Claims to 
Fame, Channel 5, 2015). Some of these examples arguably aim to expose structural 
injustices of the political present through more classic observational documentary 
traditions, while others work by generating scopic pleasures of moral judgement, re-
invented for the austerity period (Jensen 2014).  
Despite its promises to open a documentary window onto everyday life µDV it 
KDSSHQV¶ and foreground µRUGLQDU\¶ people in unscripted situations, the genre of 
µUHDOLW\¶ television has, at best, an uneasy relationship with the principles of factual 
documentary (Murray 2009; Corner 2002). Biressi and Nunn (2008) argue that as 
reality television µDOWHUHG the WHUUDLQ¶ of factual programming, µimporting a new kind 
of televisual grammar, [and] establishing new priorities for programme-makers and 
different expectations in YLHZHUV¶ (2008: 2). Critical scholarship has exposed how 
reality television, in its claim to µUHDOQHVV¶ assembles powerful forms of µFODVV-
PDNLQJ¶ judgment and devaluation, at a time when the vocabularies of social class 
are denied and euphemised (Wood and Skeggs 2011).  
Similarly concerned with the µFODVV SROLWLFV¶ of FWT, a body of sociological 
literature has interrogated FWT representations for their µWUXWK FODLPV¶ and ideological 
effects. This work argues that far from simply µGRFXPHQWLQJ¶ life on benefits, FWT 
actively shapes public understandings of poverty and benefits claimants, and that it 
largely does so in problematic and limited ways. While we do not have space to fully 
detail the range and depth of this work, we briefly outline some of this scholarship 
including our own. Shildrick et al (2014) draw upon extensive empirical research with 
disadvantaged communities to contest the claims of µLQWHUJHQHUDWLRQDO ZRUNOHVVQHVV¶ 
that underpin FWT programmes. Jensen (2014) explores how FWT programmes such 
as Benefits Britain 1949 employ a gamedoc format to create opportunities for 
voyeurism and moral judgment of benefit claimants. Exploring one of ):7¶V most 
controversial programmes, Benefits Street, Allen et al (2014) consider the gendered 
politics of the representations of, and public reactions to, its main protagonist Dee 
Kelly (or µ:KLWH 'HH¶ These included criticism of 'HH¶V µZRUNOHVVQHVV¶ but also 
more empathetic readings oriented around investments in gendered forms of labour 
and care that are under threat within neoliberal austerity. Crossley and Slater (2014) 
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and Jensen and Tyler (2015) theorise FWT as part of a wider cultural machine that 
generates stigma and incubates µDQWL-welfare FRPPRQVHQVH¶ through which public 
consent for increasingly punitive directions in policymaking around welfare is 
achieved. 
Indeed, these programmes are not only explicitly cited by politicians as 
µevidence¶ of so-called µZHOIDUH GHSHQGHQF\¶ and thus the need for welfare reform 
(see e.g., comments made by Iain Duncan Smith MP in Wintour 2014, and Phillip 
Davies MP in Cooper 2014). They also offer an µLQGH[ of FULVLV¶ (Hall et al. 1978) or 
set of ideological inflections and representational figures which animate and provoke 
contemporary anxieties around the welfare state (Hall and 2¶6KHD 2013) and seek to 
explain poverty through individual pathologies (poor choices, irresponsibility and 
laziness). The result has been a limited (but dynamic) repertoire of frameworks and 
figures ± such as the µEHQHILW VFURXQJHU¶ or µGROH FKHDW¶ - that may be used to justify 
future withdrawals of welfare. We note the abundant use of the term µEHQHILWV¶ in the 
titles of FWT programmes, which in itself highlights that µZHOIDUH¶ is not a neutral 
term (Baumberg et al. 2012; Stanley 2016) and how reality television marshals 
particular textual meanings in its workings as a classificatory apparatus.  
Skeggs and Woods argue that it is crucial to understand WHOHYLVLRQ¶V 
interventions into class formations, µSDUWLFXOarly at a time when political rhetoric is 
diverting the blame for structural inequality onto personal, individualised IDLOXUH¶ 
(2011: 2) and public attitudes towards welfare are hardening. Extant scholarship on 
FWT, cited above, has largely attended to its representation and to a lesser extent 
audience reception (McGlashan 2014). While this work is valuable, as yet the 
production processes behind FWT have been left unexamined. Responding to Imogen 
7\OHU¶V claim that µZKHQ undertaking class analysis it is inadequate to examine 
television media either in terms of programme content or audience preferences DORQH¶ 
(2015: 505), this article pursues a complementary and urgent line of enquiry into 
FWT that locates it within the transforming political economy of cultural work.  
This article is especially concerned with the perspectives of cultural workers 
involved in making or commissioning of FWT. What values and discourses do they 
use to scaffold and defend their work? How do cultural workers frame and position 
the ethics of producing television about welfare and poverty? What economic agendas 
underpin production decisions and procedures? To address these questions, we 
analyse two public debates that were organised in response to the controversy 
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surrounding FWT: the Guardian Edinburgh International Festival (GEITF) panel 
µ³Poverty 3RUQ´? Who Benefits From Documentaries on Recession %ULWDLQ"¶ (2013), 
and an event held by the BBC and anti-poverty organisation the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation (BBC/JRF) entitled µ3RYHUW\ who EHQHILWV"¶ (2015). These events were 
attended, promoted and organised by the industry, and speakers (ranging from senior 
level commissioners and producers) were invited to formally respond to the criticism 
levelled at the genre, and prepare and deliver their responses to those attending the 
events and watching them online afterwards.i 
These public debates offer a context-specific and partial perspective into the 
conditions of FWT production. We recognise that alternative methodologies would 
generate different insights into cultural ZRUNHUV¶ views and production decisions, and 
we return to these issues in the conclusion. We are specifically interested in these 
public debates as reflexive events that offer valuable insights into the officialising 
discourses used by those within the television industry to frame the programmes they 
make and the decisions underlining them. We approach these neither as revelations of 
the µWUXWK¶ of cultural production nor simply the µRSLQLRQV¶ of specific individuals per 
se. Rather we are interested in what these discourses can tell us about the governing 
logics of cultural production and cultural producers including issues of workforce 
diversity, precarity and cultural labour, and competition and deregulation within 
broadcasting. For example, elsewhere Murray (2009: 69) demonstrates how television 
networks µSDFNDJH¶ reality television programme in different ways ± as socially 
engaged and informative, or as µHQWHUWDLQLQJ¶ ± to µHQGRUVH or authenticate a particular 
television text and to attract an DXGLHQFH¶ Likewise, we are interested in identifying 
the µUKHWRULFDO VWDQFHV¶ that are used in these public-facing events to µQDUUDWLYL]H¶ and 
µSDFNDJH¶ FWT, as industry figures were called to respond to controversies it 
generated around its ethics, function and impact.  We suggest that these offer valuable 
insight into how the industrial conditions of broadcasting shape FWT production 
practices and decisions, so that particular scripts about poverty, class and welfare 
become prioritised.   
 
µ<RX GRQ¶W need to be from a council estate to make a series about life on a 
council estatH¶ Television workers, social class and µGLYHUVLW\ WDON¶ 
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Oakley and 2¶%ULHQ (2016: 3) argue that µFXOWXUDO products matter because they shape 
how we understand ourselves and our society and thus the question of who gets to 
make cultural products is a profoundly relevant RQH¶ Thus, when considering why 
and what kind of FWT representations are made, it is imperative to consider who gets 
to be a cultural producer. It is now well-established that the television workforce, like 
many other creative and cultural industries sectors in Britain, is not representative of 
the diverse audiences it seeks to serve, and is marked by gender, ethnic and social 
class inequalities (Conor et al. 2015; Creative Skillset 2014; DCMS 2015). In regards 
to the latter, the preponderance of internships and unpaid work, precarious and 
unstable patterns of work, and informal recruitment practices make it difficult for 
individuals from less privileged class backgrounds to access or sustain careers in the 
sector (Grugulis and Stoyanova 2012; Randle et al. 2014). With 15% of TV industry 
workers having attended independent or fee-paying schools (compared to the national 
average of 7%) (Creative Skillset 2014), policymakers have identified the VHFWRU¶V 
µVRFLDO mobility SUREOHP¶ and the need to widen access to the profession (SMCP 
2014). Relatedly, concerns have been raised that the disproportionally middle-class 
composition of the sector adversely impacts upon the type of media that gets made 
(House of Commons 2015; Muir 2015).  
As this Special Issue attests, discussions about diversity in cultural work have 
reached a higher pitch recently and so it is unsurprising then that these have infused 
the critiques levelled at FWT as well as industry responses to these. However, this 
µdiversity talk¶, and the work that it does, requires unpacking. To begin this analysis 
we turn to a speech given by independent television executive Tim Hincks: 
 
I GRQ¶W buy the poverty porn debate, I think WKDW¶V overblown, hysterical, I 
think these are extremely well-made shows. But, WKHUH¶V an issue LVQ¶W there, 
we get a bit exposed when it comes to shows like these. 7KHUH¶V a weak spot 
that we have that hampers programme-makers and broadcasters and LW¶V an 
industry-wide problem [that] goes beyond Benefits Street. The thing that 
makes us feel uncomfortable about shows like that, LW¶V got nothing to do with 
the creative intent or the quality which is remarkable, what makes us feel 
uncomfortable about them is that they feel like shows made by middle-class 
people about working-class people. And the reason that makes us feel 
uncomfortable is because LW¶V true. (Hincks 2015) 
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This discussion of the LQGXVWU\¶V µFODVV SUREOHP¶ reflects the complexity of industry 
responses to discussions about its class composition. Hincks explicitly acknowledges 
a discrepancy between the middle-class programme-makers of FWT and the 
µZRUNLQJ-class SHRSOH¶ represented within and consuming them. Yet through careful 
rhetorical manoeuvring, the seriousness of this particular debate is diminished; it is 
declared µRYHUEORZQ¶ µK\VWHULFDO¶ and inconsequential to the µUHPDUNDEOH¶ quality of 
the programmes themselves.  
This dual acknowledgement and disavowal of WHOHYLVLRQV¶ µFODVV SUREOHP¶ 
may be understood as what Ahmed (2006) describes as the non-performativity of 
diversity talk within public institutions such as universities. She argues that in 
claiming to be committed to diversity, these speech acts in fact block action: diversity 
commitments µJHW VWXFN¶ failing to bring about the effects to which they pledge 
action. +LQFNV¶ statement unwittingly deflects critical discussions about the politics of 
workforce composition; both signalling a set of ethical principles held by the industry 
that point towards action (such as a commitment to diversity and fair representations), 
and simultaneously diminishing the µSUREOHP¶ of class composition in the television 
workforce. Like gender and race, social class is taken into account to be repudiated 
(McRobbie 2009). As we have examined elsewhere, such diversity talk becomes 
another way to conceal inequalities within the cultural industries (Allen et al 2012).  
This process of repudiation or µRYHULQJ¶ whereby there is an assumption that 
someone is µRYHU¶ a critique and in turn works to assume they are µRYHU¶ the issue that 
has been critiqued (Ahmed 2012: 179), is reflected elsewhere within industry 
discussions about FWT as this excerpt from the GEITF panel demonstrates: 
 
Elaine Bedell (Director of Comedy and Entertainment, ITV): One of the 
things we should address is that, listening to us all, we FOHDUO\« do we all 
know people on benefits? I mean I guess our backgrounds are not necessarily 
the same as those people ZH¶UH talking about. Um, Emma, I assume \RX¶UH not 
[long pause] from a council estate? 
 
Emma Cooper (Documentaries Commissioner, Channel 4): No but my father 
is and the whole of one side of my family lives on an estate so LW¶V not too 
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much of a stretch. But yes I do feel that part of these debates gets very po-
faced and very middle-class. 7KDW¶V a bit stereotypical. 
 
Stevie (Participant/ contributor, Nick and Margaret: We Pay Your Benefits): 
But you GRQ¶W have to be on a council estate to be on EHQHILWV« 
 
Elaine Bedell: No what I meant was, are the people making these programmes 
sufficiently in touch with the people WKH\¶UH portraying or is there a sort of.... I 
mean television is a very, very middle-class RUJDQLVDWLRQ« to what degree are 
we making these shows with real empathy or to what degree are we just 
turning the cameras on them? >«@ Is it just exploitation? 
 
Katie Buchanan (Executive Producer, Skint, Keo Films): I think as 
filmmakers part of what you do is you go and discover worlds that you GRQ¶W 
NQRZ« Keo make films in jungles and rubbish tips. Have we grown up on a 
rubbish tip? No. But can we make a film there? I think if you FDQ«OLVWHQ and 
be empathetic and learn to understand and convey what people tell you then I 
think you can >«@ 7KDW¶V what filmmakers do. You FDQ¶W say you FDQ¶W make a 
film about murderers if you KDYHQ¶W murdered someone. You make films 
about worlds \RX¶UH interested in. 
 
Again, we see how the wider debate about the television ZRUNIRUFH¶V µclass SUREOHP¶ 
is explicitly acknowledged by the sector as it responds to criticisms of exploitation 
and misrepresentation. This appears to be an important step-change within the 
industry. While of longstanding interest within the sociology of cultural work and 
cultural production, class inequality within cultural work has historically been an 
issue that the industry has appeared reluctant to acknowledge, and at least unsure of 
how to address. However, while class is now µRQ the DJHQGD¶ this is not necessarily 
µSURJUHVVLYH¶ per se. In the extracts above, there is important rhetorical work being 
done in this diversity talk. We wish to draw attention to two key mechanisms through 
which questions of privilege and social distance are downplayed, and ± consequently 
± crucial discussions about the PHGLD¶V class politics are shut down. 
First, there is an alignment with values of documentary filmmaking that 
emphasise journalistic integrity, objectivity and empathy. Kate Buchanan dismisses 
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the claim that there must be a shared experience or identity between the cultural 
producer and their subjects to produce µDXWKHQWLF¶ authoritative representations. The 
social distance between those making FWT and those depicted on screen is presented 
as (already) resolved by the skilled and reflexive filmmaker who can work 
productively and ethically with this distance.  
Yet, comparing the filming of welfare claimants to filming subjects living in 
µMXQJOHV¶ or on µD rubbish WLS¶ is telling. In seeking to µGRFXPHQW¶ the lived realities of 
surviving on welfare benefits, FWT reproduces the conceits of reality television 
formats that construct µRUGLQDU\ SHRSOH¶ as, in themselves µVLJQV of the UHDO¶ (Biressi 
and Nunn, 2008: 4). In so doing, this genre recycles a particular anthropological gaze 
upon (allegedly) hidden worlds ± a key feature of reality television ± whilst 
simultaneously disavowing any consideration of the politics of exposure that underpin 
such a gaze, or the socio-political climate that generate this representational focus on 
welfare and poverty. As Kaplan (1997) notes: µWKH gaze of the colonialist refuses to 
acknowledge its own power and privilege: it unconsciously represses knowledge of 
power hierarchies and its need to dominate, to FRQWURO¶ (1997: 79). In downplaying the 
unequal power relationships between the programme-maker and subject, cultural 
workers simultaneously deny how the production decisions they make can encourage 
viewers to take up a µPLGGOH-class JD]H¶ (Lyle 2008) through which working-class 
participants are produced as abject other to the µJRRG¶ and µPRUDO¶ neoliberal subject, 
and in need of transformation (Wood and Skeggs 2011). 
Second, the claims of proximity with on-screen participants ± here made 
through cultural ZRUNHUV¶ reference to their own family histories of poverty ± work to 
disavowal class in another way. To illustrate this, we turn to another TV executive in 
which he explains the popularity of FWT as a product of austerity and its discontents: 
 
I actually think LW¶V really worrying when it feels like somehow these people 
are so far removed from who we are. I GRQ¶W think you need to be from a 
council estate to make a series about life on a council estate. But I do think it 
gets dangerous when we treat the issues of those SHRSOH¶V lives as though 
WKH\¶UH almost a different species from XV« Fundamentally we all in the 
recession « we all worry about PRQH\« the economy is up and down and so 
what \RX¶UH watching unfold is an extreme sense of what ZH¶UH all feeling 
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which is that ZH¶UH all in uncertain times. (Tom McDonald, Commissioning 
Executive for Documentaries & Science, BBC) 
 
Claiming that µZH¶UH all in uncertain WLPHV¶, or referring to familial experiences of 
poverty as in Emma &RRSHU¶V response earlier, denotes a sense of commonality 
between differently classed subjects. In some respects, this can be viewed as a 
welcome gesture, one that seeks to generate an inclusive µcommon ground¶ or shared 
experienced between more privileged cultural producers (or audiences) and people 
experiencing poverty or claiming benefits. Yet such claims also erase the very 
significant differences in how precarity materialises in SHRSOH¶V lives. As discussed 
earlier, austerity has had a disproportionate impact on already-vulnerable populations. 
While the working conditions of the middle-class have been affected by 
transformations in the economy, the working classes are disproportionately 
concentrated in the kinds of insecure, low-paid, casualised jobs that have dramatically 
increased since the crisis (Shildrick et al 2012; Warren 2014). By constructing 
austerity as a crisis that has generated universal precarity and uncertainty, these 
significant differences are erased. Again, our aim is not to single out individual 
cultural workers but to problematize the rhetorical mechanisms that work to (perhaps 
unwittingly) downplay the uneven experiences of precarity and consequences of 
austerity. Inequality is thus constantly slipping µRXW of YLHZ¶ in the processes through 
which poverty is represented and understood. ii 
This disavowal discourse also flattens out differences between cultural 
workers, reproducing the myth that all cultural workers are equally precarious. As we 
discuss in the next section, precarity as an aspect of cultural work is widely 
acknowledged. However, not all cultural workers experience precarity uniformly, and 
the extent to which this impinges upon their autonomy as cultural producers varies. 
There are considerable differences between, for example, the commissioners of a 
programme and the freelance junior researchers or casters working on it (Mayer 2014; 
Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2011). Thus, not only do claims of a universalised precarity 
obfuscate these differences in power among cultural workers. They also become a 
disciplining tool that constrains what kinds of media representations are imaginable. 
Precarity within the television industry is a significant issue (as we discuss in the next 
section)  But what do claims of universalised  precarity and disadvantage µGR¶ within 
this context, specifically when they are spoken by senior industry figures with 
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significant symbolic power? What discussions do these open up and shut down? To 
claim your labour is precarious signals a constraint impinging on ethical practices 
outside of RQH¶V control. It is akin to the gesture of µWKH VKUXJ¶ through which 
responsibility for the kinds of representations commissioners and producers make is 
abdicated.  
So far we have demonstrated some of the issues of representation engendered 
by a disproportionally privileged workforce. However, we seek to trouble overly-
simplistic claims of a mechanistic relationship between who gets hired and what 
media they make. To do this, the next two sections shift the critical lens to the 
conditions of cultural production out of which these representations emerge. 
 
Creating a µ%X]]¶ Cultural production in uncertain times  
 
The debates around FWT and its impact (intended or otherwise) capture some 
longstanding tensions that have characterised popular factual television. As FWT 
programme-makers have defended themselves against criticisms of µPDOLJQ LQWHQW¶ 
(Deans and Plunkett 2014), they have mobilised both classic µGRFXPHQWDU\¶ 
aspirations to educate and reveal µWUXWK¶ and what Corner (2002) calls µSRVW-
GRFXPHQWDU\¶ imperatives to create entertaining and µOLJKW¶ television.  
For example, Richard McKerrow, the Creative Director of Love Productions 
who made Benefits Street, remarked: µ,W¶V not demonising the poor: LW¶V a very honest 
and true portrayal of life in Britain and people are frightened by it >«@ you have to 
find different, innovative ways of making sure serious issues stay in peak [scheduling 
WLPH@¶ 0F.HUURZ¶V ambition to present µKRQHVW portrayals of life in %ULWDLQ¶ and do 
this in ways that attract peak-time audiences, must be located within a shifting 
national and global terrain of television commissioning, broadcasting and distribution. 
In the UK, since the Broadcasting Act of 1990, television has been marked by greater 
competitiveness, audience fragmentation, and a move to post-Reithian µHGXWDLQPHQW¶ 
and µK\EULGLW\¶ within µIDFWXDO¶ programming (Corner 2002; Hill 2007). Globally, 
intensifying commercial imperatives across the sector and a weakening of public-
service provision and state financing has contributed to the growth of reality 
television across a range of networks and channels (Hearn 2014; Ouellette 2010). 
%RUQ¶V (2005) ethnographic study of the BBC, for example, demonstrated how both 
the µconcept and SUDFWLFH¶ of public-service broadcasting had been radically 
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transformed by media deregulation and a post-welfare desire to reduce publicly-
funded institutions. Born exposed how budget freezes, competition from commercial 
channels, and a spectre of µPDUNHW IDLOXUH¶ led to a shift from more traditionally 
public-service inflected programming towards hybrid documentary genres in the 
BBC, which aimed to have wider audience appeal, including docu-soaps. Since 
%RUQ¶V study, the market logics that pushed programming towards what Corner 
(2002) calls µGRFXPHQWDU\ as GLYHUVLRQ¶ have further intensified. Under the current 
UK Conservative government, public service provision has come under threat by the 
BBC Review Charter and freeze on the license fee (Puttnam 2016). We note here the 
resonance between the questioning and undermining of µSXEOLF¶ institutions and ideas 
of a µFRPPRQ JRRG¶ across both the spheres of television and welfare. 
Such reforms result in an uneasy tension in the positioning and value given to 
popular factual television ± by networks or broadcasters, commissioners, critics, and 
audiences. Appeals to the more highly-venerated µFLYLF¶ educational and even critical 
principles of factual documentary thus rub up against mounting commercial 
imperatives to attract and entertain audiences through populist programming (Murray 
2009; Ouellette 2010). FWT provides an especially illuminating site to consider how 
broader economic forces shape cultural representations. Transformations in 
broadcasting not only have implications for what kind of programming gets 
commissioned, but the conditions of cultural work itself, µUHJLVWHU>LQJ@ in the 
experiences of television ZRUNHUV¶ (Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 2011: 170) and the 
products that they create.  
Cultural work and workers are increasingly µQHROLEHUDOLVHG¶ productive output 
is individualised, careers are marked by risk and vulnerability, public funding is 
uncertain and market logics are extended to the subjectivities of workers who are 
µRQO\ as good as your last MRE¶ (Blair 2001; Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2011; Gill 
2010; McRobbie 2015). Demonstrating how these conditions of industrialised cultural 
production filter down into the working practices of workers, empirical research 
illuminates the constrained and difficult spaces where those working within culture 
can negotiate and contest its representational politics. For example, Saha (2012; 2013) 
shows how British Asian cultural workers find themselves complicit in producing 
stigmatising portrayals of µ$VLDQQHVV¶ despite desires to challenge reductive 
representations. He argues that market logics and commercial imperatives constrain 
the autonomy of cultural workers, with µHSLVWHPRORJLFDO HIIHFWV¶ on how ethnicity is 
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consumed by audiences. These include pressures to attract a µPDLQVWUHDP¶ (white) 
audience by deploying exotic signifiers and clichés (e.g. curry, saris); or to µPDNH 
QRLVH¶ and generate press coverage through provocative subject matter (e.g. Islamic 
fundamentalism). Similarly, /HH¶V (2012) research demonstrates that while 
independent television producers may be driven by ethical commitments to make 
content with a social and civic purpose, these are compromised by entrenched 
neoliberal values within the sector including flexibility, enterprise and commercial 
pressures. Such findings are similarly borne out in research with workers on reality 
television programmes, whereby commercial imperatives for the programmes to 
provide dramatic tension and compelling content (thereby attracting audiences and 
advertisers) become transposed into the often-fraught and largely undervalued 
emotional labour of junior television workers who cast for shows and manage the 
conflicting needs and investments of participants, executive producers and 
commissioners (Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2011; Grindstaff 2009; Mayer 2011, 2014).  
This important work demonstrates how TV workers find their ethical or 
artistic commitments compromised by neoliberal values governing broadcasting, as 
their µVXEMHFWLYLW\ connects to political economy in the structuring of the industry, and 
in the forms and modes of creativity that are allowed within LW¶ (Lee 2012: 494). We 
find similar conflicts within the public accounts of industry figures involved in FWT. 
Specifically, discussions reveal combative ideologies coalescing around, on the one 
hand, ):7¶V claim to offer µQHXWUDO¶ accounts that µJLYH YRLFH¶ and on the other, the 
need for these shows to create a µEX]]¶   
For example, in the public debates we have analysed, programme-makers 
primarily present the FWT genre as a form of democratisation that offers authentic 
accounts of how people experience poverty:  
 
Whether or not you give a camera to a contributor or you are telling a story 
>«@ it is their voice. We are observers not participants. Nothing should be 
created, there should be no conceits, no formatting because what we are trying 
to do in the programmes that we make >«@ is simply observe and give them a 
chance to speak for themselves. (Ian Rumsey, Head of Topical for ITN) 
 
I think what is important is that people who are poor living below the bread 
line on benefits - however you want to label them - is that they have a voice 
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>«@ hearing from people at the sharp end who are living those lives is the 
most important thing. (Guy Davies, Commissioning Editor: Factual at Channel 
5) 
 
We wanted to give voice to people who are rarely heard and we wanted to do 
that in an unmediated way. (Katie Buchanan, Executive Producer, Skint) 
 
FWT is presented here as observational and µXQPHGLDWHG¶; producers are mere 
µREVHUYHUV¶ and the shows are free from µFRQFHLWV¶ This is coupled with notions of 
FWT as enabling a democratising of culture through the appearance of µRUGLQDU\¶ 
people (Biressi and Nunn, 2005; Turner 2010). FWT is positioned as µJLving YRLFH¶ to 
marginalised groups, drawing on public service principles and signalling an ethical 
commitment to widening diversity on screen.  
Yet, commitments to µJLYH YRLFH¶ through authentic, µXQPHGLDWHG¶ content 
conflict with intensifying commercial imperatives to attract audiences. Such conflicts 
are encapsulated in the comments made by industry figures. For example, in the 
GEITF panel, Emma Cooper stated: µ,¶P not an entertainment commissioner, ,¶P a 
documentary commissioner but at the same time I want people to see them so sure 
they have interesting content and I GRQ¶W think we should apologise for that¶ Cooper 
distances herself from the label of µHQWHUWDLQPHQW¶ endeavouring to negotiate the 
hierarchy of value ascribed to television genres. As Murray writes, µGRFXPHQWDU\ is 
seen as a valid and productive social and artistic endeavour, while reality television is 
often vilified or GLVPLVVHG¶ (2009: 68). Cooper positions herself within the more 
valued genre of documentary, tempering the negative connotations of the 
µHQWHUWDLQPHQW¶ label. But she also signals that television must have interesting 
content that audiences want to see, an ambition associated with more populist 
programming. These conflicting directives are even more palpable in the following 
statement by one commissioner at the BBC/JRF debate: 
 
In a world of multi-channel, we have to write headlines for our titles. Now I 
know WKDW¶V not popular with some people, but we do need to get people to 
watch. We are a commercial channel, ZH¶UH telling stories of Britain, [...] 
ZH¶UH very proud and kind of comfortable with the way that we tell these 
stories. We tell them with integrity. [...] We will find titles which will grab 
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people and will make people watch them and ZH¶UH not ashamed of that. It 
makes a difference for us in terms of people coming to the channel. (Guy 
Davies, Commissioning Editor: Factual at Channel 5) 
 
FWT seeks to appeal to the principles of classic documentary; yet it is located within 
a context of commercial competition, where programmes must find ways to attract 
increasingly fragmented audiences by µFUHDWLQJ a EX]]¶ and µZULWLQJ headlines for 
WLWOHV¶ This begs the question, which representations of poverty and welfare are 
created to achieve such goals? We contend that to stand out in a fast-paced, 
multifarious media landscape, representations of poverty and welfare within FWT 
become flattened to align with commercially successful generic television and film 
conventions.  
This was exemplified in an exercise undertaken at the BBC/JRF event, where 
delegates were presented with a µVWRU\ arc ± the KHUR¶V MRXUQH\¶ and tasked with 
creating µgood VWRULHV¶ about poverty and welfare for television (Figures 1 and 2). 
 
 
Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
 
 
This exercise troubles the kinds of claims made by TV executives above that FWT 
offers µXQPHGLDWHG¶ portrayals of poverty, and those made by politicians that cite 
FWT as µHYLGHQFH¶ of societal ills such as welfare dependency and worklessness. It 
highlights how narratives in FWT are heavily edited, scripted and actively cast for in 
order to generate commercially successful content. And it points to the labour of 
television workers in creating constructed and stylised representations of 
µDXWKHQWLFLW\¶ The Story Arc draws on long-held and formulaic conventions from 
Hollywood film (see Pramaggiore and Wallis 2005). The narrative of conflict and 
resolution is a tried and tested formula that is considered to offer tales that audiences 
are familiar with and comforted by. The use of these conventions in FWT highlights 
the limitations and problematic consequences of creating programmes about poverty 
and welfare within the industrialised confines of television production.  
Specifically the use of standardised narratives is especially troubling when we 
consider the topic at hand. These µSRVLWLYH¶ stories may be well-intentioned; they may 
be seen as an attempt to counter the more sensationalised and stigmatising 
representations of benefit claimants as feckless and irresponsible. Yet, in calling upon 
the heroic benefit recipient who µPDNHV JRRG¶ by µZRUNLQJ KDUG¶ to get off benefits, 
such story arcs inadvertently individualise poverty rather than consider its structural 
causes. So, even when programme-makers explicitly seek to create representations 
that do not follow the familiar template of abjection and demonization (that 
historically characterise much of WHOHYLVLRQ¶V portrayals of the working-class), 
representations of working-class life are flattened. By scripting narratives of virtue 
and individual heroism, these narratives reinforce the binary of the µGHVHUYLQg and 
XQGHVHUYLQJ¶ poor. Such production devices recycle stubborn welfare myths and 
smooth out the highly complex lived realities of poverty. Such storylines cannot for 
example articulate the churning cycle of µORZ pay and no SD\¶ in which many families 
find themselves, or the growing prevalence of in-work poverty (Shildrick et al. 2012). 
In the final section, we interrogate further the systematic constraints that shape 
how cultural workers commission, script and cast for µWHOHYLVLRQ that JUDEV¶ 
Identifying the multiple, networked revenue streams associated with FWT, we 
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contend that the genre is an especially illuminating case study of the economic models 
of capital accumulation characterising contemporary global media.  
 
 
µ.LFNLQJ up a sWRUP¶ The economic value of FWT  
 
FWT operates not only as a new television genre, but also represents a µQHZ cultural 
LQGXVWU\¶ (Jensen 2014) organised through an emergent economic model. FWT has 
been praised by some within the television industry for its ability to µNLFN up a media 
VWRUP¶ (Considine 2014) and the attention it can generate in post-broadcast 
discussions across different media formats. This includes newspapers, social media 
and additional television programmes which operate as satellites to the original 
production. For example, in addition to its television audience, Benefits Street 
(Channel 4 2014) µNLFNHG up a VWRUP¶ on social media during broadcast by instructing 
audiences to use their designated Twitter hashtag. This hashtag generated several 
hundred news stories on both article and digital versions of newspapers, and initiated 
a (hastily assembled) live discussion programme scheduled to follow the final episode 
(Benefits Britain: The Live Debate, Channel 4 2014). The economic model used in 
FWT is adept at generating parasitical media attention as a distinct form of capital 
accumulation within contemporary media industries. This economic model has long 
roots that stretch through to the emergence of reality formats: 
 
As one of the most effective global industries for generating new sources of 
revenue, television has been highly adept at finding new markets: enabling 
new forms of exploitation through opening out the previously µSULYDWH¶ forms 
of intimate life; challenging traditionally protected labour markets (flexible 
contracts for those working in the industry, and the blurring of the boundaries 
between employees and participants); and establishing new terms of market 
exchange with audiences (pay-per-view, for instance). Attention on 
governance can deflect attention away from the reason for governance, which 
is to lubricate the operations of capital. (Wood and Skeggs, 2011: 16) 
 
Reality television, in its lubrication of the operations of capital, ushered in a 
transformed set of production processes that enabled television content to be 
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produced, edited and broadcast more cheaply, faster and with lower production costs, 
including the exploitation of a ready supply of unpaid or low-paid cultural workers 
(Hearn 2014, Ross 2014). The economic context of popular factual television 
production came to resemble a microcosm of global neoliberalism, with increasing 
internal pressures to commission revelatory, sensationalist and provocative 
programming - exemplifying what Dovey (2000: 21) termed the µSXEOLF sphere turned 
inside RXW¶. By embracing more lightweight and mobile filming and sound technology 
and filming µRQ the ZLQJ¶ reality formats such as docu-soaps revived an aesthetic 
sense of authentic rawness that was, conveniently, cheaper and faster to produce 
(Kilburn 2003). Analyses of the political economy of reality television highlight how 
these formats provide a convergence mechanism for delivering customers from one 
medium to another (Ouellette and Hay 2008), for example from television to web to 
magazine.   
 FWT employs the same cost-saving production methods pioneered by reality 
television, but also accelerates some of these dimensions even further under the 
imperative to µNLFN up a media VWRUP¶ and to generate intense bursts of media 
attention across multiple sites. Transformations in news media, including a dramatic 
consolidation of news media ownership in the UK (Media Reform Coalition 2014) 
and slashed budgets for investigative journalism (NUJ 2012), have contributed 
towards a much greater reliance by journalists on press releases, social media and 
recycled news content. µ1HZV VWRULHV¶ about those appearing in FWT productions 
have become a staple of online news sites that use a µFOLFNEDLW¶ economic model, 
whereby controversial headlines are used to funnel more users to recycled content 
pages and thus drive up the value of advertising side-banners. The symbiotic 
relationships between broadcasters, production companies and news media workers 
are augmented and enhanced by these parallel economic agendas across different 
media fields. The lines between producer and consumer have further blurred and 
FWT audiences frequently serve as an unpaid labour force in themselves, as their 
social media and online discussion (live-tweeting during broadcast for example) are 
extracted by journalists and transformed into µQHZV¶ content. A generous 
interpretation would see these shifts as a µGHPRFUDWLVLQJ¶ of media, empowering 
citizens to µVSHDN EDFN¶ through µYR[ SRSV¶ and user generated comment. Viewed 
more pessimistically, such strategies herald the rise of µFKXUQDOLVP¶ and the 
supplanting of sober and informed investigation with celebrated ignorance and 
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µWDEORLGLVDWLRQ¶ (see Turner 2010). However interpreted, these shifts are undoubtedly 
part of a complex economic model that has developed new ways to lubricate the 
machinery of capital by investing less in paid cultural work and identifying new ways 
to extract more value from unpaid cultural labour. 
 We locate FWT as a genre that is being used to test, develop and extend these 
economic models to generate and extract value. Many dimensions of this genre 
echoes practices of earlier reality formats such as the use of low-paid cultural 
workers. These practices which gained momentum and soon became standard across 
the industry (Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2011; Ross 2014). However, some 
dimensions of FWT production are emergent and distinct. We see the development of 
a parasitical media economy, whereby an increasing range of media agents are able to 
accumulate capital as the µmedia storm¶ transfers from one field of production to 
another, used to excellent effect in FWT. Broadcasters can maximise advertising 
revenue streams through swelling record audience figures: With the first series of 
Benefits Street (2014) delivering Channel 4 with its highest viewing figures in 2014, it 
created television advertising space valued at around £1million (Suart 2014), whilst 
opening up other revenue streams such as sponsorship and online advertising. 
Channel 4 also harnessed and capitalised upon the public debate Benefits Street 
provoked through the broadcast of additional live µHYHQW WHOHYLVLRQ¶ (Benefits Britain: 
the Live Debate). Production companies can consolidate their economic capital 
through inexpensive labour and through franchising formats as transnational 
commodities. Love 3URGXFWLRQV¶ annual profits increased by twenty-five per cent in 
the year they produced Benefits Street and Keo Films capitalised on the success of 
Skint (2013), franchising the format to Australia as Struggle Street (SBS 2015). 
Newspapers can draw upon the debate such programmes create to produce content, 
sell copies and drive readers to their online pages. With increasing links between 
newspapers and television production companies (for example, in July 2014 
Sky/News International acquired a 70% stake in Love Productions in order to expand 
its international distribution (Tozer 2014)), the financial incentive to produce 
parasitical and sensationalist content intensifies. 
 Finally, the economic value of the media storm µkicked up¶ by FWT may be 
accumulated by, or via, those who appear in front of the camera lens. FWT 
participants are a crucial, and usually invisible, part of the cultural labour force of 
television. The financial compensation of reality television participants has always 
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been uneven - some are paid, but the majority are not (Grindstaff 2014, Mayer 2011). 
But in FWT, financial compensation is forbidden since participants are welfare 
claimants and any payment for work would jeopardise receipt of benefits. As Wood 
and Skeggs further argue (2011: 17), µLW is the use of unpaid µRUGLQDU\ SHRSOH¶ 
marshalled from audiences into production regimes that intensifies the possibilities 
for exploitation. Reality television therefore extracts value in different ways from the 
performances of unpaid SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ We propose that, in its focus on benefit 
claimants, FWT producers have stumbled upon another avenue for reducing 
production costs. Simultaneously, we acknowledge that some of this value can be 
retained by FWT participants, and that there may be complex reasons which compel 
them to take part in unpaid, exploitative television work. While FWT programmes 
and producers seek to elicit particular stories of poverty and to µVFULSW¶ claimants in 
predetermined ways, this does not mean that FWT participants are µGXSHG¶. They may 
seek to creatively trouble such scripts and resist stereotypes imposed upon them, or 
they may pursue opportunities to capitalise on their media visibility, even if only for a 
short time or under constraining conditions (Tyler 2011).  
A crucial element of the FWT attention economy is the configuration of 
newspapers, magazines and public relations industries that, together with (or via) 
FWT participants, are developing routes through which value can be banked and 
extracted from new µPLFUR-FHOHEULWLHV¶ Questions of consent, fame and aftercare with 
respect to FWT participants merit closer scrutiny. It is unclear whether the aftercare 
for participants is adequate and if it can compensate the negative impacts of the 
programming. It is also unclear who is best able to capitalise on the production and 
circulation of micro-celebrities. Those who appear on FWT profit far less, even those 
scarce few who appear to find careers as micro-celebrities outside of the programme.  
Perhaps most notable here is Dee Kelly, known as µ:KLWH 'HH¶ from Channel ¶V 
Benefits Street. While the large majority of participants in FWT experience only 
fleeting fame and return to anonymity as soon as the programme ends, Dee has made 
media appearances on talk shows and radio. She also entered the Celebrity Big 
Brother house in 2014, and appeared in her own Channel 5 documentary. Yet this 
media career has subsequently dwindled. Furthermore, the economic and symbolic 
capital generated by 'HH¶V media visibility has not come without cost. Dee has been 
subject of intense media vitriol and a public hate campaign, and revealed she 
experienced depression following the programme (see Allen et al 2014). Furthermore 
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she has publically criticised the producers of Benefits Street for a lack of consultation 
with on-screen contributors in the editing process, resulting in a sensationalised and 
unfair representation of her community. The micro-celebrities occasionally emerging 
from FWT can sometimes, as µ:KLWH 'HH¶ shows, surf the wave of the media storm 
they help µNLFN XS¶ but are invariably injured. As Grindstaff reminds us, the 
opportunities presented by reality TV participation always µFRPH with obligation, 
compromise and ULVN¶ (2014: 336). 
  
Conclusion 
 
Since exploding onto British television screens in 2013, FWT programmes have 
proved highly popular and deeply controversial, entangled with wider public and 
policy debates about poverty against a backdrop of radical welfare reform. Such 
media representations are deeply significant. FWT does not simply reflect the social 
world. Rather it constitutes it, intervening into the current conjecture of austerity in 
powerful ways by shaping public understandings of poverty and welfare. 
We have argued that FWT offers an illuminating site through which to explore 
the competing agendas governing contemporary media, and the implications of these 
on cultural producers and the texts that they create. In many ways our analysis of 
FWT has affirmed the importance of challenging who gets to be a cultural producer, 
questioning the impact of a predominantly middle-class television workforce on how 
social class, poverty and welfare are represented and consumed. One of the most 
fascinating dimensions of the µUHIOH[LYH PRPHQW¶ occasioned by FWT has been the 
ease with which senior industry figures have co-opted µGLYHUVLW\ WDON¶ and other 
critical vocabularies around the politics of representation on ways that shut down 
discussions about its stubborn µFODVV SUREOHP¶ (McRobbie 2015). However, we 
contend that FWT representations cannot be explained by the class composition of the 
television workforce alone. While we do not dismiss the importance of widening 
access to the industry, we argue that a more socially µGLYHUVH¶ workforce will not in 
and of itself, produce µUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDO SDULW\¶ (Gray 2016: 246).  Rather, our analysis 
has shown that the conditions of industrialised media production itself constrain and 
direct cultural workers to produce digestible scripts around poverty and welfare, 
which can then be capitalised upon and extracted for value. Cultural sociology must 
therefore ask not simply µZKR gets to make cultural products?¶ (Oakley and 2¶%ULHQ 
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2016) but also µLQ what context?¶ Both a critical and systematic analyses of cultural 
labour conditions, and a radical reconceptualisation of who a cultural worker is, are 
crucial to understanding how the FWT industry works as a classificatory apparatus. 
More research is needed to better understand how neoliberal economic forces 
come to direct cultural workers and shape the cultural products they make. In this 
article, we have analysed the official discourses presented by senior industry 
figureheads at public-facing events. Had we interviewed these figures in a different 
context, they may well have provided alternative accounts of FWT. Whilst there are 
challenges to studying media production (Paterson et al 2016), further empirical 
research into FWT would enrich and extend our understanding of the relationship 
between production, representation and consumption. This might usefully include 
interviews with cultural workers, in particular those at junior levels, and observations 
of the production of FWT programming. Furthermore, as a varied and mutating genre, 
future research into FWT must attend to this complexity.   
Herman Gray (2016: 252) argues that µLW is time to ask that our research tell us 
a different story about the operations of power/knowledge and the role of media in the 
making of racial inequality (and its potential for the making of racial MXVWLFH¶. Like 
Gray, we assert that critical interrogations of the logics of cultural production and 
how these come to bear upon cultural representations are crucial. We hope that this 
article contributes to telling a µGLIIHUHQW VWRU\¶ about the role of television, both in the 
making of class inequality and ± more optimistically - its potential for facilitating 
class justice. 
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i
  We have not anonymised industry figures that we quote since these two events were public and full 
recordings of each are freely available to view online on the following websites 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WZ4e7WveQlw   (Accessed 13 November 2016) and 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/responsibility/tvpoverty-conference (Accessed 10 February 2017)  
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ii
 These rhetorical stances are not unique to the cultural industries. They abound elsewhere in public 
and political discourse, from the discourse of the µVTXHH]HG PLGGOH¶ that has circulated across policy 
and media sites since the recession to the outrage sparked by the UK Labour 3DUW\¶V claim in the 2017 
general election campaign that those earning over £70,000 are rich (almost three times the average 
salary in the UK) (Horton 2017) 
